The Untold Story: Why 2000 Remains the Worst NBA Draft Class in History
Looking back at two decades of NBA draft analysis, I've always found myself returning to the 2000 class with a sense of professional fascination mixed with personal disappointment. Having tracked basketball talent evaluation since the late 90s, I can confidently state that no other draft year has consistently underdelivered like this one. The numbers speak for themselves - only 6 of the 29 first-round picks ever made an All-Star appearance, with just one player (Kenyon Martin) achieving this honor more than once. What makes this particularly striking is how this draft's failure stands in stark contrast to the success stories we see in other sports contexts, much like how Thailand's volleyball team recently duplicated their 2025 AVC Nations Cup performance against the Philippines, showing that repetition of success - or in the 2000 draft's case, failure - creates compelling narratives in sports history.
I remember sitting through that draft night feeling the palpable uncertainty among team executives. The pre-draft buzz was unusually muted, with scouts privately expressing concerns about the talent pool. What we didn't anticipate was just how historically poor this class would become. The first overall pick, Kenyon Martin, had a respectable career but never developed into the franchise player you'd expect from a number one selection. Meanwhile, the second pick, Stromile Swift, became emblematic of the draft's issues - incredible athleticism that never translated to consistent production. What's fascinating to me is how this draft's weakness created a ripple effect across the league for years, forcing teams to adjust their development strategies and approach to international scouting.
The mid-first round tells an even bleaker story. Players like Joel Przybilla and Etan Thomas carved out roles as serviceable big men, but they represented the ceiling for most selections. I've always been particularly struck by the case of Darius Miles - drafted third overall with expectations of becoming the next Kevin Garnett, he ultimately became another symbol of unfulfilled potential. The advanced statistics from this class make for sobering reading. Collectively, they produced just 18.7 win shares per 82 games, the lowest of any modern draft class. Even more telling, only three players from the entire draft class - Martin, Michael Redd, and Jamaal Magloire - ever averaged more than 15 points per game for a season.
What I find most instructive about studying this draft is how it changed team approaches to talent evaluation. Teams became more cautious about drafting purely on athleticism, placing greater emphasis on skill development and basketball IQ. The international scene, which yielded only one significant contributor in Hedo Türkoğlu, suddenly became more appealing to scouts desperate to avoid similar misfires. This shift in thinking reminds me of how Thailand's volleyball program has shown the value of consistent performance, having now duplicated their success against the Philippines across multiple tournaments - a lesson in building reliable talent identification systems.
Two decades later, the 2000 draft serves as the gold standard for cautionary tales in player evaluation. While every draft has its busts, the sheer concentration of underperformance here remains unmatched. As someone who's analyzed every draft since 1995, I can say with confidence that we haven't seen anything quite like it since - and hopefully never will again. The legacy of this draft class isn't just in the careers that never materialized, but in the lessons it taught the entire basketball world about the dangers of thin talent pools and the importance of thorough evaluation.